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A B S T R A C T
Failure to address unsustainable global change is often attributed to failures in conventional environmental
governance. Polycentric environmental governance—the popular alternative—involves many centres of au-
thority interacting coherently for a common governance goal. Yet, longitudinal analysis reveals many poly-
centric systems are struggling to cope with the growing impacts, pace, and scope of social and environmental
change. Analytic shortcomings are also beginning to appear, particularly in the treatment of power. Here we
draw together diverse social science perspectives and research into a variety of cases to show how different types
of power shape rule setting, issue construction, and policy implementation in polycentric governance. We de-
lineate an important and emerging research agenda for polycentric environmental governance, integrating di-
verse types of power into analytical and practical models.
1. Introduction
Global environmental change is a wicked challenge: non-reducible,
variable, and complex. It is also an urgent problem—failure to progress
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), for in-
stance, could permanently compromise finite natural resources and
inter and intra-generational well-being. While there is general agree-
ment that averting unsustainable change is desirable, social and policy
responses are often constrained by limited capacity and the fact that
single actors or singular approaches—whether top down or bottom
up—cannot effectively tackle such problems. Social and policy solu-
tions need to be experimental, adaptive, distributed, and multi-scale
(Loorbach et al., 2017; Ostrom, 2010a; Pattberg and Widerberg, 2016).
Environmental governance structures have broadened in response
to such complexity and interdependency, from top-down centralised
approaches to decentralised, community-based, or polycentric ar-
rangements, incorporating not just principles of efficiency but also
those of equity, legitimacy, and accountability (Lemos and Agrawal,
2006). Polycentric governance structures in particular have become
popular with analysts since Elinor Ostrom’s reflections in 2010 on the
failure of top down solutions (Ostrom, 2010a).
The concept of polycentric governance is best understood when jux-
taposed with monocentric governance (Ostrom et al., 1961). An ideal-
type monocentric system is one controlled by a central predominant
authority (e.g. a comprehensive governmental authority or private
monopoly responsible for all goods and services). By contrast, a poly-
centric system comprises multiple governing authorities at different
scales which do not stand in hierarchical relationship to each other but
are engaged in self-organisation and mutual adjustment (Ostrom,
2010a).
Polycentric systems are attractive to a wide variety of interests in
that they allow for more policy innovation and diffusion across multiple
organisational units, whether through “hard” regulation or “soft” in-
struments such as economic incentives, voluntary agreements, self-
regulation, and sustainability certification (Jordan et al., 2013, 2015).
Advocates suggest that this form of governance creates new opportu-
nities for multiple actors at multiple levels to take responsibility for
initiating and implementing sustainability and resilience solutions
(Carlisle and Gruby, 2017; Pattberg and Widerberg, 2016; Steffen et al.,
2018). Polycentric governance is also understood to provide more
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opportunities for representation of different social actors than mono-
centric governance. As such, its inclusivity can be viewed as a more
legitimate form of governance. In providing opportunities for innova-
tion and experimentation across multiple organisational units, poly-
centric governance can also enable the development of tailor-made
solutions that are fit for purpose (Lebel et al., 2006). It additionally
provides a level of flexibility and nimbleness that may not be possible in
traditional hierarchies. Furthermore, polycentric governance is re-
garded as more robust: when one part of the system fails there are
multiple other parts able to step in (Ostrom, 2010b).
While not a panacea, polycentricism holds much promise for solving
the multiple governance challenges of environmental change (Aligica
and Tarko, 2012; Andersson and Ostrom, 2008). However, new re-
search on polycentric governance is also challenging normative pre-
scriptions, somewhat controversially (Gallemore, 2017; Sovacool et al.,
2017; Sunderlin et al., 2015). In many cases, polycentric governance
systems are struggling to cope with the growing risks of rapid social and
environmental change (Jordan et al., 2018). Documented problems
include high transaction costs, inconsistencies, freeloading, un-
anticipated effects, gridlock, and ultimate implementation failure
(Morrison et al., 2017). A new strand of environmental policy science is
also beginning to highlight how the concept of polycentricity is plagued
by inherent contradictions and assumptions, and that some big gaps in
knowledge remain. Power dynamics have been highlighted as one of
these gaps (Morrison et al., 2017), alongside assumptions about policy
experimentation (Huitema et al., 2018), lack of understanding of
feedbacks (Berardo and Lubell, 2019), and limited evaluation of effec-
tiveness (Schoenefeld and Jordan, 2017). The central focus of this
Perspective is the pronounced lack of analysis of the role of power.
In this Perspective, we define power as the uneven capacity of dif-
ferent actors to influence the goals, process, and outcomes of poly-
centric governance. We argue that while it is axiomatic that all gov-
ernance (whether monocentric, integrated, decentralised, or
polycentric) involves uneven power dynamics, many studies of poly-
centric governance provide only partial analyses of the initial design or
the emergent structure of polycentric systems, ignoring uneven power
dynamics or relegating them to being exogenous to the system. In the
rare cases where power is highlighted, we show that analyses tend to
focus on the potential negative effects of (higher-level) power; they
rarely highlight the process nor the positive outcomes of powerful
steering or “orchestration” (Abbott, 2017). We argue that scientists and
policymakers can improve their ability to explain and enhance the
environmental outcomes of polycentric systems by re-conceiving poly-
centric governance not just as a structural solution or a diagnostic but
also as a set of diverse institutions, agencies, and other social actors
influenced by power-laden social relationships. Distilling the power
dynamics inherent in polycentric governance will thus be a critical step
in moving from polycentric governance as a concept to polycentric
governance as a theory and practice for addressing global environ-
mental change. We conclude by highlighting future research needs
which are dependent on a power-centred analysis.
2. The power gap in polycentric governance and why it matters
All governance involves power: more powerful actors receive more
favourable outcomes than less powerful ones; equality and fairness are
rare. However, while many analysts of polycentric governance have
often acknowledged power dynamics, they have not directly addressed
how power dynamics can challenge or reinforce polycentric governance
systems (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2006; Mansbridge, 2014). As a result,
studies of polycentric environmental governance often remain snapshot
analyses of only the initial design or the emergent structure of poly-
centric systems, with post-hoc analysis of power dynamics often re-
legated to an explanatory postscript about “a black box of politics” or
“the lack of political will”. Fig. 1, for example, shows that while there
has been a dramatic rise of scientific interest in polycentric
environmental governance since Elinor Ostrom’s influential 2010
Global Environmental Change article, scientific interest in the power
dynamics of polycentric governance is only now emerging as an im-
portant field in its own right.
There are a variety of reasons why the power gap persists in poly-
centric environmental governance. The complexity and messiness of
polycentric systems means that power dynamics are hidden more ef-
fectively than in other governance types; they are difficult to observe,
tough to define, slippery to measure, tricky to generalise about, and
challenging to manage (Sova et al., 2016). Scientists, policymakers, and
practitioners working at the interface between the application of sci-
ence and policy can also find power dynamics sensitive and un-
comfortable, and therefore may often deliberately or inadvertently
overlook them.
Oversight of power dynamics also has its roots in disciplinary di-
visions and trends. For example, while important strands of political
science have focused on the strategies of powerful actors in driving and
addressing global change (such as the World Trade Organisation, the
United Nations, the United States, and multinational corporations)
(Nye, 2008), these insights have often remained separate from the
polycentric environmental governance literature, which tends to focus
on the diffusion of power across groups of actors (with the notable
exception of Abbott (Abbott, 2017; Abbott and Bernstein, 2015)). The
bias towards diffuse power also reflects the broader governance lit-
erature, where researchers in the key fields of American federalism and
European Union (EU) studies (Feiock, 2013; Hooghe and Marks, 2003;
Scharpf, 2006), political science (Crook and Manor, 1998), public
policy and administration (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006), and institutional
economics (Ostrom, 2010b), have spent many years exploring the dif-
fusion of power away from powerful sole actors such as a centralised
governmental authority. And as ably illuminated by Partzsch (2017),
the small number of critical social scientists that do focus on power in
environmental governance regimes tend to concentrate on the potential
negative effects of visible higher-level power; they rarely deal with
power that emerges from the bottom-up or is enabling rather than in-
hibiting.
Addressing the power gap is important because it can open up a
range of new ideas, resources, and opportunities for scientists and
practitioners concerned with understanding, crafting, and working
within polycentric environmental governance (Kashwan et al., 2018).
An improved understanding of power in polycentric systems, for ex-
ample, can unmask and diagnose power asymmetries and abuses - not
just corruption but also conflicts of interest, “street-level deals”, in-
consistent law enforcement, illegal finance, and hidden resistance to the
agreed environmental goal. It can also shed light on how mobilisation
of different types of power can allow actors to redistribute risks to
vulnerable populations, perpetuate the politics of avoidance, deny or
distort science to delay action, and undermine a government’s capacity
to act. For example, new research shows that polycentric systems can be
protected and strengthened by the fact that they are made up of mul-
tiple institutions and actors, but that this multiplicity can in fact permit
manipulation and exploitation of actors and goals and, in addition,
screen or mask this very behaviour. Such masking can aid polycentric
system drift (whereby a regime fails to adapt to a major contextual
shift) or polycentric system conversion (whereby the original goals of a
regime are converted to new goals) (Morrison, 2017; Okereke, 2018).
Addressing the power gap can also reveal power dynamics that are
less negative and more enabling, through examination of how mobili-
sation of countervailing forms of power - such as new interest groups
and coalitions and new monitoring mechanisms and associations - can
enhance the transparency and accountability of polycentric systems and
lead to positive changes to government rules, industry policies, and
societal norms. In the case of the global polycentric climate system, for
example, analysts are now beginning to study how powerful actors such
as cities, provinces, religious leaders, and NGOs are beginning to steer
polycentric climate governance, by shaping and mobilising norms and
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beliefs through virtual, online spaces such as social media (Dorsch and
Flaschland, 2017; Gillard et al., 2017; Homsy and Warner, 2015). Fi-
nally, addressing the power gap can improve scientific understanding of
polycentric systems as both individual systems and in a comparative
sense. For example, a power-centred analysis can show that while two
polycentric systems may appear to have similarly diverse and inter-
connected centres of decision-making on paper, in practice - because of
where or how power is used - one system may have more concentrated
centres of decision-making, with important implications for environ-
mental performance (Gallemore and Munroe, 2013).
3. Getting a grip on power
Power matters in all governance: because it critically determines
and explains regime effectiveness. However, while the many theories of
power converge upon this point, they often diverge on how to under-
stand power. Some theories emphasise modes of exercise (e.g. coercive
force, financial reward, institutional authority, ideological influence)
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Dahl, 1961; Foucault, 1980; Weber, 1922),
whereas others emphasise types of capacity (e.g. “power over”, “power
within”, “power to”, and “power with”) (Dewulf and Elbers, 2018;
Gaventa, 2006; Partzsch, 2017) or types of power-laden actor relations
(e.g. dependence, competition, antagonism) (Avelino and Wittmayer,
2016). Here, we seek to elaborate upon and extend a pre-existing ty-
pology of power (Morrison et al., 2017; Fig.1) identified to be specific
to polycentric systems. We do so to provide an umbrella framework for
connecting new research on polycentric environmental governance
with rich strands of theory on power dynamics across the social sci-
ences, including the key disciplines of environmental politics, en-
vironmental policy, and environmental sociology (Fig. 2).
First, we introduce the polycentric power typology, which focuses
on power as the uneven capacity to influence the goals, process, and
outcomes of polycentric governance through (i) power by design, (ii)
pragmatic power, and (iii) framing power (Fig. 2). We then briefly
apply the typology to three robust examples (longstanding, re-
presentative, and intensively studied) to illustrate the need for and
potential of more fully fledged and comparative analyses of power in
polycentric environmental governance (Table 1). Our goal is not to
render each example or each type of power analytically clean, rather to
show how power is relational and emerges through iterative interac-
tions over time.
3.1. Power by design
A key underpinning of political science is that there is a difference
between power and authority whereby power needs to be combined
with legitimacy in order to be authoritative (Weber, 1922). In ex-
tending the original concept of polycentricity developed by Polanyi
(Polanyi, 1951), Vincent Ostrom focused on the authoritative power of
metropolitan governments to provide public goods and services in a
polycentric system (Ostrom et al., 1961). This type of power is written,
legislated, and visible within the deliberate design of governance, and is
based on the legitimate authority of states and other powerful actors to
independently legislate, create formal rules, tax, distribute resources,
and design policy and markets (Jordan et al., 2013). Authoritative
power to set rules and design incentives can also be distributed amongst
actors at different levels, such as in a federated or decentralised unitary
system (Crook and Manor, 1998). In polycentric systems, authoritative
power can also be traced through other modes that are also formal but
less direct, such as formal delegation and orchestration (Abbott and
Bernstein, 2015). Social scientists typically undertake documentary
review of the relevant institutional arrangements (e.g. transnational,
federal, decentralised arrangements) to understand how authoritative
power is officially designed and formally distributed within such sys-
tems.
3.2. Pragmatic power
Discretion—or exertion of “rules-in-use”—is also an application of
power and can manifest not just as cooperation but also as false com-
pliance, feigned ignorance, tokenistic behaviour, and non-decision-
making (Lipsky, 1971; Ostrom, 2010b; Sabatier, 1988). Analysis of
pragmatic power in polycentric governance is challenging as it involves
the lower-level and less visible power to interpret, certify, and monitor
policy priorities, governance frameworks, and compliance agreed by
state and non-state actors. Such actors are vested with “practical au-
thority”, that is local recognition of their capabilities “on-the-ground”
(Abers and Keck, 2013). This kind of power is exerted through the day-
to-day practice and implementation of formal and informal rules and
norms. Pragmatic power often represents the critical link between in-
stitutions and action, and can explain lack of compliance and the in-
ability of formal government to implement unpopular policies. Stake-
holders and policy practitioners are capable of withholding or granting
legitimacy to a decision in accordance with their overall values, thereby
affecting the implementation and effectiveness of the decision. Prag-
matic power can also explain how innovation, experimentation, and
Fig. 1. Dramatic rise of scientific interest in polycentric governance since Elinor Ostrom’s influential Global Environmental Change article on polycentric governance
(2010) (black, dark gray) and increasing interest in “polycentric governance” and “power or politic*” (light gray).
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creativity emerge as actors seek to navigate what they perceive to be
overly rigid rules (Anderies and Janssen, 2013). When discretion is
exerted in polycentric governance, the values and perceptions of the
actors involved are often more critical than the design properties of the
governance mechanism itself. In seeking to understand pragmatic
power, an entire ecosystem of institutional conditions and plurality of
interests, aspirations, and strategies amongst various actors and agen-
cies can appear to manifest as an “ecology of games” (Lubell et al.,
2017). Governance analysts typically understand pragmatic power dy-
namics through interview, survey, ethnography, and participant ob-
servation. These methods can be immersive and long-term, comprising,
for example, multiple key informant interviews with decision-makers,
legal experts, key bureaucrats, and other participants in governance
processes, and lengthy periods of participant observation.
3.3. Framing power
In polycentric systems, power is not only the property of author-
itative government hierarchies, street-level bureaucrats, and policy
stakeholders - it is also in the hands of lobbyists, nonprofits and the
media. These actors bargain for influence through rational and ma-
nipulative persuasion, inducement, sanction, and coercion (Dahl,
1961). They also use softer techniques of ideological framing that make
it difficult for other actors to recognise their influence (Bachrach and
Baratz, 1963). Where certain actors contest top-down decisions or
perceive them as illegitimate, they may also find ways to subvert, dis-
rupt, and avoid formal rules and regulations. Such power is less visible
than power by design or pragmatic power and is created by and
emerges from the way issues are constructed (e.g. organisation and
communication of selected aspects of reality) and agendas are built (e.g.
lobbying, rent seeking, patronage) (Fuchs and Feldhoff, 2016; Scoones,
Fig. 2. Key concepts and dominant interpretations of power relevant to polycentric environmental governance. The different social science disciplines identified tend
to illuminate different types of power, although there is increasing crossover.
Table 1
Power Dynamics in Different Polycentric Governance Systems.
European Water Framework Directive (WFD) Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation Scheme (REDD+)
Great Barrier Reef Regime (GBR)
Power by
Design
The European Parliament and Council commits
member states of the European Union to a Directive
on achieving good qualitative and quantitative
status through 6 yearly cooperative River Basin
Management Plans for designated River Basin
Districts (Jager et al., 2016).
The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) exerts top-down
multilateral power over forests in developing
countries through a comprehensive system of
national policy guidance, technical assistance,
positive incentives, and stakeholder partnerships
(Kashwan, 2015; Nagendra and Ostrom, 2012;
Sunderlin et al., 2015).
The Australian national government, through
legislation, statutory delegated authority, and
participatory marine planning stipulates
conservation and sustainable use of the Great
Barrier Reef, in agreement with the State of
Queensland, and reinforced by UNESCO World
Heritage listing, and other national and state laws
(Evans et al., 2014).
Pragmatic
Power
Local bureaucrats aligned with agricultural interests
use discretion to weaken the standards developed
and to avoid full application of key principles of the
Directive at the individual Basin level (Behagel and
Arts, 2014).
National governments, local elites, and foreign
‘carbon entrepreneurs’ bypass indigenous
community safeguards and exploit insecure tenure
systems to capture carbon rights and benefits (den
Besten et al., 2014; Lund et al., 2017). Local NGOs
pragmatically exploit program design to achieve
wider security of tenure for indigenous groups
(Astuti and McGregor, 2017).
Bureaucrats aligned with industry interests use
discretion to avoid implementation of relevant rules




Agricultural industry interests frame the Water
Framework Directive as a remote intervention by
bureaucrats in Brussels, in order to ensure that water
quality issues dominate the implementation process
at the basin level and issues of water access and
supply are minimised (Brouwer et al., 2013;
Voulvoulis et al., 2017).
The World Bank, the UN-REDD Programme, and
other non-governmental organisations in
Washington DC, Geneva, and London undertake
additional agenda-setting through their own
REDD+ objective-setting, geographic targeting,
and financial allocation (Gallemore and Jespersen,
2016;Di Gregorio et al., 2017).
Industry groups, politicians, and sections of the
media shape a discourse that GBR regulation,
scientists, and NGOs are stalling economic
development, creating a public appetite for repeals
of complementary state and national legislation on
coastal development, land-clearing, and renewable
energy (Björnberg et al., 2017).
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2016). When individuals or collective actors possess the highly devel-
oped social skill to understand people and environments, frame lines of
action, and mobilise people in pursuit of these frames, they are pos-
sessing and exercising framing power – in ways that can be both de-
liberate and accidental (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011; Snow and Moss,
2014). In exercising framing power, powerful players can create an
“environmentality” which frames the objectives of environmental
governance, the process of governing, the resources available, and the
structural design (Agrawal, 2005; Bene et al., 2009; Leach, 2008). This
framing endorses what is legitimised and prioritised by those actors,
and it rejects what is illegitimate or deprioritised (Wilson et al., 2018).
Powerful players then establish and maintain complex social networks
around their frames. These so-called narrative networks (Lejano et al.,
2013) and their countervailing “weapons of the weak” (Scott, 2008,
1990) are incremental, subtle, and hidden, and only now beginning to
appear in analyses of polycentric governance (Boelens et al., 2015).
When use of framing power is highlighted, analysts tend to focus on
how it is used to marginalise communities, rather than how it might be
used to empower communities. Discourse analyses (Foucault, 1980,
2013), through institutional examination (Schmidt, 2008) and process
tracing (Collier, 2011), are typically used to interpret the data.
By recognising these different types of power, it becomes clear that
power is not only endowed but also contested, negotiated, reinforced,
and undermined through different relationships between actors in a
polycentric system (Lukes, 2004). And by extending analysis of power
in polycentric systems beyond the negative and coercive effects (“power
over”), it is also possible to understand the process of orchestration and
the positive and enabling effects of power (“power within”, “power to”,
and “power with”) (Gaventa, 2006; Lukes, 2004; Partzsch, 2017). This
allows us to see how multiple players, each mobilising and deploying
different types of power, interact collaboratively and competitively to
produce diverse social and environmental outcomes. It also reveals how
they do so at multiple scales and in closed, invited, and claimed or
created venues (e.g. internal government meetings, public consultation
processes, community protests). In Table 1, we apply the three types of
power to illustrate how addressing power dynamics can improve our
ability to explain and enhance the environmental outcomes of different
polycentric governance regimes. Table 1 illustrates that while some
scientists are beginning to recognise and study these topics and issues
within polycentricity studies (especially watershed studies: Berardo and
Lubell, 2016; Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014), this is still an emerging
field, with many practical and conceptual challenges. In particular,
future development of this typology requires shifting focus from the
emergent structure of polycentric governance to asking under what
conditions do different types of actors, with different types of power,
achieve their preferred outcomes?
4. Extending analysis of power in polycentric environmental
governance
Studies of polycentric environmental governance are beginning to
emphasise the significance of power dynamics. This is true in recent
analyses of polycentric governance under the Least Developed
Countries Fund and in the United Kingdom (Gillard et al., 2017;
Sovacool et al., 2017), across cities (Homsy and Warner, 2015), and
systems for water sustainability in the EU and the United States
(Brouwer et al., 2013; Garrick et al., 2013), and marine sustainability in
the Coral Triangle (Gruby and Basurto, 2014) and Chile (Gelcich, 2014;
Table 1). However there is still scant assessment of the power dynamics
of polycentric governance over time, and even less analysis of how
power can be mobilised in pursuit of (or resistance to) environmental
goals. Most analyses of polycentric governance continue to focus on the
structural dimensions of polycentric governance, ignoring power dy-
namics that are more enabling and less visible, and mobilised by a
variety of actors and functioning across multiple scales and venues.
We conclude by proposing a number of research challenges going
forward which are dependent on distilling power dynamics. They relate
to ongoing assumptions and unanswered questions about experimenta-
tion, functions and beneficiaries, problem variation and emergent potential
in polycentric governance. While we identify four research areas as
important, there are others that are equally valid and we encourage
researchers to explore all of them.
4.1. Polycentric governance as an experiment in power
Power dynamics influence not only the emergence and design of
polycentric governance structures but also decisions about policy
choices and the way policy outcomes are assessed within those struc-
tures. Elinor and Vincent Ostrom proposed that all policies are ex-
periments therefore an important analytical task is to clarify variables
and causality. While network analysts have produced interesting visual
depictions of governance, which can essentially be viewed as “struc-
tural fingerprints” of the more visible distributions of power within a
polycentric system, there is little comprehension of how different types
of power explain patterns of conflict, competition, convergence, and
divergence in policy choices and outcomes across polycentric systems
(Lubell et al., 2017; Scott and Thomas, 2017; Weible and Heikkila,
2017). Better understanding of interdependence and feedbacks is es-
sential. Re-emphasising polycentric governance as an experiment in
power thus allows us to move beyond claiming that “power matters” to
understanding which variables explain how power matters, how ex-
planatory variables depend on other variables (e.g. number and type of
actors, scalar and temporal dimensions, state of knowledge, range of
drivers, range of possible solutions, range of venues), and how poly-
centric governance might be effective relative to other arrangements
and non-structural influences (Poteete et al., 2010; Turnbull et al.,
2018). This effort may necessitate the introduction of new quantitative
precision, for example, through comparative analysis of how various
attributes of polycentric structure influence and are influenced by the
different types of power (Bodin, 2017; Smith et al., 2014). Substantial
inroads (drawing on institutional collective action frameworks, and
social network analysis, semiautomated text analysis and fuzzy cogni-
tive mapping techniques) are already being made to overcome tradi-
tional shortcomings in collecting and analysing in-depth and sensitive
data across space and time (Eakin et al., 2017; Heikkila and Weible,
2018). Less frequent, but just as insightful in analysing self-organising
power dynamics, is analysis of the existence of concrete groups (e.g.
non-profit organisations and industry lobby groups) and their involve-
ment in setting the agenda for public-good plans and initiatives, the size
and hierarchical arrangement of those systems, and the receipt and
distribution of organisational resources at different scales in the system.
Social scientists can elicit this kind of information through surveys,
interviews, and documentary or archival reviews (e.g. of organisational
annual reports and other records which provide participation data, data
on the receipt and distribution of fiscal resources, employee and budget
numbers, personnel data, media reports on conflict) (Clarke and
McCool, 1996; Morrison, 2017; Varone et al., 2017). Analysis of such
data has the potential to provide deep insights into how power dy-
namics change over time in polycentric systems, and how those power
dynamics channel and resolve conflict. However, most analyses of
polycentric governance are yet to vigorously combine these methods to
explore power dynamics in-depth and systematically.
4.2. Explaining the functions and beneficiaries of polycentric governance
Many studies have shown that the current trend in the design and
development of governance arrangements is undoubtedly towards
greater polycentric governance, suggesting that top-down hierarchies
remain deeply unpopular, and that the benefits of polycentric govern-
ance are more socially acceptable and are perceived to outweigh any
associated pitfalls (Abbott and Bernstein, 2015; Cox et al., 2016; Jordan
et al., 2015). However, if our goal is to improve understanding and
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response to environmental change, a deeper debate on how power
dynamics affect the function and beneficiaries of polycentric govern-
ance will bring a great deal to our cause. Policy scholars have usefully
begun to explore polycentric systems as complex adaptive systems of
interlinked games, which are not just structural but also functional
(Berardo and Lubell, 2019). Functions are the processes operating
within the system that affect its evolution and outcomes. The over-
arching function of polycentric governance, for example, is to provide a
self-organising process for environmental governance in the absence of
centralised environmental leadership. Within this overarching function
are other functional processes such as cooperation, learning, and
equitable resource distribution. While ‘ecology of games’ scholars have
provided important quantitative illumination of the cooperative struc-
tures and functions of polycentric governance, less attention has been
paid to learning and resource distribution functions, and the question of
how different types of power are equalised or exacerbated in poly-
centric systems (Berardo and Lubell, 2019). Comprehensively assessing
the functions and beneficiaries of polycentric governance requires more
attention than has hitherto been paid to understanding the different
types of power, and how the different types of power work to maintain
or undermine key principles of equity, legitimacy, transparency, and
accountability (Schoenefeld and Jordan, 2017). How we extend current
work to think about power-laden functions and beneficiaries will also
be critical in moving polycentric governance from concept to theory
and practice.
4.3. Understanding how power dynamics vary the problem in polycentric
governance
While polycentric governance has proven ideal for portraying
complexity in governance, early descriptive analyses often tended to-
ward simplistic dichotomies - positioning polycentric and monocentric
governance at two ends of a spectrum. More recent reach has shown
that polycentric and monocentric systems almost always coexist, and
they are often intertwined in complicated ways (Galaz et al., 2012;
Cumming et al., 2017; Lubell et al., 2017). In fact, a range of govern-
ance systems (e.g. monocentric systems, federal systems, decentralised
unitary systems) are characterised by multiple centres of authority in-
teracting coherently across multiple scales (Dorsch and Flaschland,
2017). Using polycentric governance as a diagnostic confirms that de-
spite perceptions of the non-hierarchical nature of polycentric govern-
ance, the shadow of hierarchy is ever-present, as is the case with the
REDD+ scheme, the WFD, the GBR system, and many federal systems.
However we know little about how polycentric systems cope when
problems exceed system boundaries or when powerful actors emerge
far away from the problem’s geographic centre. Does performance
weaken if different types of power are concentrated at progressively
further/higher levels? Some important work is already showing how
polycentric arrangements embedded within established hierarchies can
draw on centralised state control to good effect (Pahl-Wostl and
Knieper, 2014). By applying our conceptual framework, future research
can begin to explore whether and how different types of power are
appropriate for different desired outcomes at different scales and at
different points in time (Ingalls, 2017). For instance, highly decen-
tralised polycentric governance may be best suited to addressing es-
tablished environmental problems where there is general agreement on
the solution and relative symmetry of power (e.g. point-source water
pollution). Whereas, highly centralised polycentric governance may be
best suited to new environmental challenges (e.g. global climate
change), where there is less agreement on the solution and power is
highly asymmetric (Dewulf and Elbers, 2018; Mathias et al., 2017).
Connecting the polycentric power typology with recent literature on
problem-driven network motifs (Bodin and Tengo, 2012) and govern-
ance modes (Ingold et al., 2018) could enable development of a dy-
namic set of power-laden polycentric motifs whereby the performance
of different governance systems can be related to the changing power
dynamics of a problem.
4.4. Navigating the emergent potential of polycentric governance
All of these research questions are complicated by the fact that
polycentricity both affects and is affected by power dynamics, in a dual
relationship much like the Giddensian style relationship between
structure and agency (Giddens, 1984). In other words, as systems be-
come more polycentric, they affect what kinds of power become most
important and how. This dual relationship and its emergent possibilities
is clearly another Pandora’s box for analysts and practitioners. Of in-
terest here is the potential for some types of polycentric arrangements
to be more empowering of environmentalist agents than others, and
indeed to facilitate further empowerment. The emergent benefit of
certain types of polycentricity has been alluded to in the literature but is
yet to be systematically explored and exploited by analysts and prac-
titioners. Understanding it requires a broadened conception of power as
not just top-down and repressive; but also bottom-up and enabling.
Indeed, while the idea that power need not always be top-down and
repressive is not new (Foucault, 1980, 2013), many contemporary
analyses of power continue to gloss over that observation by focusing in
on the negative aspects of top-down power. In seeking to understand
the emergent potential of particular types of polycentric governance,
there is exciting potential for synthetic insights to be drawn from po-
litical anthropology (on how countervailing power is developed e.g.
Scott, 1990, 2008), complex adaptive systems (on how bottom-up in-
novation, experimentation, and creativity emerges and transforms e.g.
Anderies and Janssen, 2013; Bell and Morrison, 2015), and political
geography (on how power dynamics in polycentric systems evolve and
interrelate across scale and space (e.g. Morrison, 2017; Hettiarachchi
et al., 2017). Using the power typology to draw these insights together
could yield important new insights on specific forms of polycentricity
that are ideal for enabling positive yet unrealised power.
5. Conclusion
There has been a dramatic rise of scientific interest in polycentric
governance over the last decade, and increasing attention paid to the
power dynamics that underpin such systems. The polycentric power
typology can accelerate understanding of polycentric governance by
encouraging analysts to shift focus from the structural dimensions of
polycentric governance to examining the power-laden conditions that
enable different types of actors, with different types of power, to
achieve their preferred outcomes.
Previous studies have shown that polycentric governance has
proven more useful as a diagnostic and a description than a panacea for
solving the multiple challenges of global environmental change
(Andersson and Ostrom, 2008). Yet as global society faces multiple
social and environmental pressures and messiness of governance, it is
critical that we undertake the ambitious task of revealing and managing
power in our polycentric quest for sustainability. Distilling the power
dynamics in polycentric governance is not an easy task, but we believe
that efforts to analyse and manage the functions, structures, outcomes,
and potential of polycentric environmental governance will strengthen
and be strengthened by incorporating power dynamics and addressing
the analytic and practical challenges outlined herein.
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